In a recent exchange between Kemi Badenoch, the leader of the UK’s Conservative Party, and Nigeria’s Vice President Kashim Shettima, two prominent figures have engaged in a spectacle of misplaced pride and denial that only highlights their disconnect from the harsh realities facing Nigeria today. Badenoch, who has openly criticized the country of her birth, and Shettima, who represents the very political class responsible for Nigeria’s current state of disarray, have both displayed a level of delusion that must be condemned.

Badenoch’s remarks about Nigeria are sharp and uncompromising. She describes a country plagued by corruption, insecurity, and political dysfunction, a place she fled at the age of 16 to escape what she witnessed as systemic misgovernance. Her words echo the experiences of millions of Nigerians who, like her, have endured the ravages of poor leadership, social inequality, and violence. From her own harrowing memories of constant fear, poverty, and instability, Badenoch’s criticisms are rooted in personal experience — and they are undeniably valid. To be clear, her comments are not the reckless slander of a detached outsider; they are the anguished reflections of someone who has lived through the very conditions she now condemns.

Yet, it is her critics, particularly Vice-President Kashim Shettima, who must bear the greater responsibility for the current state of Nigeria. Shettima, an architect of the status quo, represents a ruling elite that has presided over a nation where more than 133 million Nigerians live in multidimensional poverty, where insecurity reigns supreme, and where basic human dignity has been eroded by the very political leaders tasked with safeguarding it. His criticisms of Badenoch ring hollow, for they come from a man who is part of a government responsible for the suffering of millions of citizens. Shettima, whose administration has overseen rampant corruption, a failing economy, and an out-of-control insurgency, has no moral ground to stand on when chastising anyone for speaking out against Nigeria’s ills.

To quote the seminal work of Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, both Badenoch and Shettima embody the psychological scars of colonialism and the profound effects it has on identity. Fanon’s exploration of how colonized individuals internalize racial inferiority and disassociate from their own culture resonates deeply in the case of these two figures. Badenoch’s comments reflect a complex, albeit painful, relationship with Nigeria — a country marked by colonial legacy and an inability to reconcile its past with its present. Shettima, on the other hand, represents the perpetuation of colonial structures within the Nigerian state, where the political elite remains disconnected from the suffering of the masses, clinging to power while the country disintegrates under its own weight.

Badenoch’s dismissal of Nigeria as a “socialist nation” is misinformed but not entirely unfounded, considering the pervasive corruption and mismanagement that define much of the political landscape. However, her view of Nigeria as a hopeless, irredeemable place is dangerously simplistic. As Fanon would argue, colonialism and its psychological aftermath are not an irreversible sentence; they are a system that can, and must, be dismantled. In this regard, Nigeria’s potential for transformation remains strong, and its people, despite the betrayal of their leaders, possess the resilience and capacity to reclaim their country.

The reality is that Nigeria’s greatest hope does not lie in figures like Shettima or Badenoch, who are too distant from the daily struggles of ordinary Nigerians to understand the depth of their pain. Rather, the hope lies in the Nigerian people themselves — those who continue to fight against overwhelming odds, who struggle to survive in the face of monumental challenges, and who dream of a better future. They are the ones who will eventually push back against the incompetence and corruption that have held the country hostage for so long.

In the words of Frantz Fanon, “each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfill it, or betray it.” The Nigerian people, despite being betrayed by their leaders time and again, will not give up on their mission of creating a just, prosperous, and secure Nigeria. The battle for Nigeria’s future will be long and hard, but with a new generation of committed, fearless Nigerians emerging from the social firmament, there is hope that a new dawn will emerge after the defeat of the current crop of disastrous leaders.

In conclusion, while Kemi Badenoch may find solace in her new identity and career in the UK, and while Shettima may continue to play the part of Nigeria’s status quo defender from the comfort of power, the real heroes of this story will be the Nigerians who, against all odds, continue to fight for a better tomorrow. The road to that better future will not be easy, but with unwavering resolve, Nigerians will take their country back and build a nation worthy of pride — a pride that is, and will always be, rooted in their struggle for justice, dignity, and freedom.

As President Bola Tinubu prepares to present the 2025 national budget to the National Assembly, the Federal Government is poised to significantly overshoot its domestic borrowing target for 2024 by N4 trillion, representing a 67% increase from the initial budget projection.

The escalating borrowing comes despite widespread concerns about the nation's mounting debt burden. Preliminary data reveals that the government has already borrowed N8.93 trillion from domestic investors in the first eleven months of 2024, compared to the planned N6 trillion for the entire year. Current borrowing trends suggest that total borrowing could reach N10 trillion by year-end.

This borrowing surge coincides with the government's plans for the 2025 budget, which aims to finance a deficit of N9.22 trillion through domestic and external borrowings. This represents an 18% increase from the N7.808 trillion deficit in 2024.

According to the Federal Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning, the 2025 budget deficit will be financed through:

- New domestic and foreign borrowings of N9.22 trillion

- N312.33 billion from privatization proceeds

- N3.55 trillion in drawdowns on existing multilateral and bilateral project-tied loans

Detailed borrowing breakdown shows that in the third quarter of 2024, the government borrowed N2.134 trillion through various instruments:

- Nigeria Treasury Bills (NTBs): N1.181 trillion

- FGN Bonds: N939.246 billion

- FGN Savings Bonds: N14 billion

The Debt Management Office (DMO) and Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) data also highlight significant growth in domestic debt. In the first half of 2024, the Federal Government's domestic debt stock increased by 38.6% to N66.957 trillion from N48.314 trillion in the same period in 2023.

Borrowing composition in the first half of 2024 included:

- NTBs: N11.8 trillion (17.64% of total borrowing)

- Monthly FGN Bond auctions: N52.315 trillion (78.13% of total)

- Sukuk Bonds: N1.092 trillion (1.6% of total)

- FGN Savings Bonds: N55.196 billion (0.08% of total)

The significant increase in borrowing raises questions about the government's fiscal strategy and long-term economic sustainability.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

The leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have agreed to extend a six-month grace period for Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, giving them time to reconsider their planned departure from the regional bloc. The decision follows a summit on Sunday, where ECOWAS leaders sought to address the countries’ scheduled exit, set for January 29, 2024, exactly one year after the three nations announced their intention to leave.

The exit marks a significant reversal of decades of regional integration. Despite ECOWAS efforts, the junta-led governments of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—located in the insurgency-ravaged Sahel—have increasingly distanced themselves from the bloc. These countries have formed their own alliance, deepened defense ties, and even considered abandoning the West African currency union.

In a joint statement on Saturday, the three countries reaffirmed that their decision to leave ECOWAS is final. They also announced that, even after their exit, they would maintain visa-free travel for all ECOWAS citizens—a move seen as an attempt to mitigate concerns about the impact on the bloc’s freedom of movement and common market, which serves 400 million people.

The planned withdrawal comes at a turbulent time for the Sahel, a region plagued by political instability and military coups since 2020. The junta governments have increasingly aligned with Russia, shifting away from their historical ties with former colonial power France and other regional partners.

Dismantling Lies: Report Finds Hamas Used Inflated Gaza Death Figures That Included Natural Deaths and Cancer to Stoke Anti-Israel Sentiments

While pro-terror cheerleaders screeched on college campuses and flooded streets around the world, they used death figures in Gaza, provided by Hamas, to justify their anti-semitism.

According to a new report from the Henry Jackson Society, unsurprisingly, the figures from Gaza used by the terrorists to justify their ongoing terror were inflated to include natural deaths and deaths from cancer.

The report also notes that the numbers falsely listed men as women and registered adults as children in an apparent attempt to garner sympathy.

In his report, Questionable Counting: Analysing the Death Toll from the Hamas-run Ministry of Health in Gaza,  Andrew Fox noted the disturbing findings coming from the Hamas-run Gaza health ministry, used to gaslight the world.

Men listed as women to inflate female fatalities. Analysis of Gaza Ministry of Health (MoH) fatality data reveals repeated instances of men being misclassified as women. Examples include individuals with male first names (e.g. Mohammed) being recorded as female. This misclassification contributes to the narrative that civilian populations, particularly women and children, bear the brunt of the conflict, potentially influencing international sentiment and media coverage.

Adults registered as children. Significant discrepancies have been uncovered where adult fatalities are reclassified as children. For instance, an individual aged 22 was listed as a four year-old and a 31-year-old was listed as an infant. Such distortions inflate the number of child casualties, which is emotionally impactful and heavily emphasised in global reporting. These misrepresentations suggest a deliberate attempt to frame the conflict as disproportionately affecting children, undermining the credibility of the fatality data.

Disproportionate deaths of fighting-age men. Data analysis indicates that most fatalities are men aged 15–45, contradicting claims that civilian populations are being disproportionately targeted. This age demographic aligns closely with the expected profile of combatants, further supported by spikes in deaths of men reported by family sources rather than hospitals. This evidence suggests that many fatalities classified as civilian may be combatants, a distinction omitted from official reporting.

Inclusion of natural deaths in reporting.Despite the typical annual rate of 5,000 natural deaths in Gaza, the fatality data provides no accounting for such figures. This omission raises concerns that natural deaths, as well as deaths caused by internal violence or misfired rockets, are being included in war-related fatality counts. Instances of cancer patients, previously registered for treatment, appearing on war fatality lists further support this assertion. Such practices inflate the reported civilian death toll, complicating accurate assessments of the conflict’s impact.

Media underreporting of combatant deaths. Analysis of media coverage reveals that only 3% of news stories reference combatant deaths, with outlets like the BBC, CNN, Reuters and The New York Times primarily relying on Gaza Ministry of Health figures. These figures often lack verification and fail to distinguish between combatants and civilians. The omission creates a skewed narrative that portrays all casualties as civilian, thus shaping public opinion and international policy based on incomplete or manipulated data. For example, more than 17,000 Hamas combatants are estimated to have been killed, yet these figures are largely excluded from global reporting.

The legacy media has little interest in reporting the truth. Unsurprisingly, the report finds reporting on Gazan deaths is no different.

In a survey of media organizations, 98% cited the false figures provided by the Hamas-run Gaza Ministry of Health.

A mere 5% of the surveyed media organizations cited numbers released by the Israeli authorities.

The Gateway Pundit

WESTERN PERSPECTIVE

Ukraine services say they destroy Russian train carrying fuel

Ukraine's SBU security service said on Sunday it had launched an operation to destroy 40 rail cars carrying fuel to Russian troops in an area of the Zaporizhzhia region Moscow holds in southern Ukraine.

The SBU told Reuters the operation involved different intelligence and military services and unfolded over a series of stages.

"The aim was to disrupt the logistical supply routes for fuel from Crimea to temporarily occupied areas of Zaporizhzhia," it said in a statement.

Reuters could not independently verify the Ukrainian account. Russia made no immediate comment on the reported incident.

The SBU said one of its units organised a sabotage operation that damaged a rail line as the train was moving near the village of Oleksiivka in a Russian-held part of Zaporizhzhia region.

The train was halted, with tanker cars ablaze, and army units fired U.S.-supplied HIMARS missiles at the site.

"The missiles struck the locomotive and cars at the end of the train. The enemy was unable to reach the tanks and salvage some of the fuel," the statement said.

"As a result of the special operation, the locomotive and 40 tanker cars were destroyed and an important rail line used to supply Russian troops was taken out of service for an extended period."

Russian forces control about 70% of Zaporizhzhia region and a Ukrainian military spokesperson said last month Kyiv expected Moscow to launch concerted attacks in the region soon.

Russian forces also control about 70% of neighbouring Kherson region and about 80 percent of the Donbas in the east, the main theatre of current clashes in the 33-month-old war.

RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

Ukraine replaces commander amid Russian advance on key city

Ukraine’s military leadership has changed the commander of the Donetsk tactical group amid Russia’s continued advance toward the city of Pokrovsk in southwestern Donbass. The replacement of General Alexander Lutsenko was announced on Friday by Ukrainian MP Mariana Bezuglaya on Telegram.

Pokrovsk (also known as Krasnoarmeysk) is the largest population center under Ukrainian control in the west of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). It has gone from a major supply hub for the frontline forts to being on the front line itself.

General Alexander Tarnavsky, who participated in the “failed southern counteroffensive in 2023” will be taking his place, Bezuglaya revealed. The general commanded the Ukrainian forces operating in the city of Avdeevka when Russian forces captured it. Tarnavsky claimed the chaotic retreat of Ukrainian forces from Avdeevka was in fact going according to plan.

The co-chairman of the council on integrating Russia’s new territories, Vladimir Rogov, connected the change of commander with the difficult situation for the Ukrainian troops. “The urgent change of the commander…is symbolic, the enemy directly points to the disastrous and difficult situation on the Pokrovsk and Kurakhovo directions,” he commented, analyzing the incident for news agency RIA.

In the past 24 hours, Russian troops have liberated two villages in the DPR: Vesely Gai, located ten kilometers south of Kurakhovo, and Pushkino, 15 kilometers south of Pokrovsk. Kurakhovo is heavily fortified by Ukrainian forces and remains one of the last few major populated areas they control in southwestern Donbass. Pokrovsk is about 30 kilometers north of Kurakhovo. Last month, Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky referred to these areas as “the most difficult” for Ukrainian forces.

Back in November one Ukrainian commander told CNN that troops on the Pokrovsk front have been told to shoot unidentified persons on sight, fearful of Russian patrols infiltrating the sparsely held line. Another one told the outlet that only about 60 soldiers defended the key town of Selidovo when Russian forces took it last month.

Reuters/RT

A mere four years after emerging from a civil war, in 1974, Nigeria was at the beginning of an oil boom. Then, as today, the country was in the middle of a debate about fiscal federalism and revenue allocation. Unlike today, however, there were significant differences: the country was under military rule and the men leading the debate were all soldiers. In the fifty years since then, the structure of this debate and the geo-political symmetries that define it have evolved only a little.

The immediate spark for the debate fifty years ago was the publication of the statutory allocations to the twelve states of the federation for the fiscal year 1974-75. With a population of 2.5 million, Mid-West State received N139.9 million or 23.7 per cent of the allocation. Rivers State, whose population was 1.5 million, received N101.1 million.

Isawa Elaigwu, the semi-official biographer of Yakubu Gowon, the army general who was Nigeria’s military head of state at the time, observed about this that “while both Rivers and Midwestern States, comprising 7.3% (4 million) of the country’s total population, shared between themselves 40.83% (N241.00 million) of the total allocation to the states, the ten other states which accounted for 92.7% (51.6 million) of the country’s population, shared among themselves 59.17% (349.2m) of the statutory allocation.”

Usman Faruk, the commissioner of Police who governed the North-Western State was unhappy with the dissension over the sharing of the allocation because, he said, all of them in the Supreme Military Council then agreed to it. Joseph Gomwalk, another commissioner of Police and then military governor of Gowon’s own Benue-Plateau State; and Jacob Esuene, who governed the South-Eastern State, called for a more objective system of revenue allocation. If they knew what such a system looked like, they didn’t say. Kwara’s military governor, David Bamigboye, as well as General Abba Kyari of the North-East, went on record to call for a review of the allocation formula. For their part, Oluwole Rotimi and Mobolaji Johnson, military governors respectively of the Western and Lagos States, advocated for “a revenue allocation formula that would guarantee responsible and stable government for Nigeria.”

Nigeria’s search for a workable federalism in many ways can be reduced to the search for precisely such a formula. It has proved elusive. If anything, it may have gotten even more so. In the 34 years between 1946 and 1980, spanning the colonial and post-colonial periods and including military as well as elected civilian regimes, the country burnt through the reports of at least eight blue ribbon panels on the question of fiscal federalism.

On the eve of independence in 1958, the report of the Raisman Commission recommended the creation of a Distributable Pool Account (DPA) into which was to be paid 30 per cent of revenue from mineral rents and royalties, and from import duties. The regions retained 50 per cent of the revenue from mineral rents and royalties from their region, while the central government took 20 per cent. 70 per cent of the revenue from import duties went to the central government.

Six years later and four years after independence, the Binns Fiscal Commission increased the DPA share of the income from import duties from 30 per cent to 35 per cent at the expense of the share of the central government. Importantly, the report set its face against the principle of derivation, replacing it with what it called the principle of “financial comparability.” On this basis, it recommended the sharing of the DPA receipts as follows: Northern Region, 42 per cent; Eastern Region, 30 per cent; Western Region, 20 per cent; and Mid-Western Region, 8 per cent. Lagos was then the federal capital. Up to this point, the fiscal balance largely favoured the regions, which contributed resources to the central government.

In 1968, Nigeria’s post-colonial crisis of state legitimacy had already exploded into a year-old civil war. Under pressure from both the economic costs of the war, as well as its structural antecedents, Yakubu Gowon, the war-time Supreme Commander (as he was then known), called upon IO Dina, a former History lecturer at the University College Ibadan, to lead what the regime called an Interim Revenue Allocation Review Committee.

The legacy of the Dina Committee recommendations was very far-reaching and suited the regimental mood of the military. The Committee addressed frontally the issue of taxation and public goods. It recommended a centralisation of taxation, as well as the harmonisation of the produce marketing boards, which were, until then, mostly regional. The Dina Committee also recommended a centralisation of the funding of higher education and the replacement of the DPA with what it called a State Joint Account. In addition, the committee recommended that states should retain 100 per cent of rent from onshore extractive operations on the basis of derivation and also receive another 10 per cent of royalties revenue as derivation.

Even in the midst of an existential conflict at the time, the fuss that followed in the wake of the Dina Committee report was deafening. Officially, the Federal Military Government rejected the Dina Committee Report. In reality, Isawa Elaigwu recalls that “….Gowon did not raise dust over the issue but quietly implemented most aspect of this report through the back door at the appropriate time.” The result is that the Dina Committee Report has been quite influential in shaping Nigeria’s version of federalism.

Gowon enjoyed three advantages at the time in his handling of the unitarising tendencies that underpinned the recommendations of the Dina Committee. First, the civil war was an extenuating circumstance. Second, the regimental traditions of military government limited the degree of elite dissension. Third, as a military ruler, he ultimately did not have to suffer any institutional constraints similar to those imposed by a parliament or its equivalent under elected civil rule.

For the current incumbent fifty years later, a civilian seeking to accomplish what would be the most far-reaching restructuring of Nigeria’s fiscal fundamentals in 110 years, none of these advantages exists and he suffers many more debilitations besides.

By some coincidence, in the year that Gowon constituted the Dina Committee, the celebrated Kenya political scientist, Ali Mazrui, explained the challenges of structural stability in post-colonial African states in terms of two underlying crises of state legitimacy and of regime legitimacy.

Fiscal reform on the ambition evinced by the proposals now under consideration in Nigeria assumes the existence of a capable state which enjoys affinity among citizens, an overwhelming percentage of whom should be documented. None of these can be taken for granted in Nigeria. The evidence from across the fields of financial inclusion, electoral participation, and taxation suggests that the proportion of documented Nigerians does not exceed 40 per cent. It will take more than a few convenient ebullitions to address this.

Any government will be challenged in addressing it. An administration that suffers from manifest issues of legitimacy lacks the currency to trade with in this situation. The crisis that afflicts the current proposals is that of a government unwilling to put in the work required to redress deficits of state and governmental legitimacy around the country. To address what is evidently a political problem, the government has chosen instead to escape into self-inflicted technocratic gobbledygook.

Fiscal governance and reform is not as complex as the administration and its mouthpieces would like to suggest. Taxation is more than mechanical computation. It is the centrepiece of the social compact between a state and its citizens. With considered inadvertence, the administration of Bola Tinubu has done itself a world of good by inspiring these increasingly raucous debates about the state of that compact in Nigeria or the lack of it. It will be best served by listening to the debate in humility while it learns.

Nigeria has made substantial progress in repaying its International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt, paying $1.22 billion over three consecutive quarters from late 2023 to mid-2024. The payments have dramatically reduced the country's outstanding debt to the IMF.

The debt repayment breakdown shows:

- Q4 2023: $401.73 million

- Q1 2024: $409.35 million

- Q2 2024: $404.24 million

These payments have resulted in a significant reduction of Nigeria's IMF debt, dropping from $3.26 billion in June 2023 to $1.16 billion by June 2024 – a 64.42% decrease within one year.

The loan originated in April 2020 when the IMF disbursed $3.4 billion in emergency financial assistance to help Nigeria address economic challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and a sharp decline in oil prices. The loan was approved under the Rapid Financing Instrument with a five-year tenor and a two-year moratorium.

According to the Central Bank of Nigeria's (CBN) 2022 financial statements, the loan carries an interest rate of 1% per annum, with the CBN responsible for loan repayments.

President Bola Tinubu's administration is expected to pay a total of $3.19 billion to the IMF, with the previous administration likely having paid around $320 million.

The repayment schedule includes:

- 2024: $1.76 billion (principal and interest)

- 2025: $865.27 million

- 2026 and 2027: $33.99 million per year (interest only)

The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has announced a ₦150 million fine for Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) found guilty of facilitating the illicit distribution of newly minted naira notes to currency hawkers. This decision comes as part of the CBN’s ongoing efforts to curb the illegal flow of mint naira notes into the hands of unauthorized traders.

In a circular issued on Friday, signed by Mohammed Olayemi, Acting Director of the CBN’s Currency Operations Department, the central bank expressed concern over the growing prevalence of mint naira notes being sold by hawkers, which disrupts the proper distribution of cash to customers. Olayemi stated that the practice undermines the efficient circulation of currency to the public.

“The CBN has observed with concern the illegal flow of mint banknotes to currency hawkers and other unscrupulous economic agents who commodify Naira banknotes, thus hindering effective cash distribution to customers and the general public,” Olayemi said.

The CBN further announced plans to intensify efforts to monitor cash distribution, including periodic spot checks at banking halls and ATMs, as well as mystery shopping at identified hotspots for currency hawking across the country.

The circular emphasized that any DMBs or financial institutions found to be involved in facilitating the illegal flow of mint banknotes would face an initial fine of ₦150 million per branch. Subsequent violations would lead to more severe penalties under the relevant provisions of the Bank and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) 2020.

To prevent further violations, the CBN has urged DMBs to tighten their internal controls, processes, and procedures around their Cash Management Centres, branches, and teller operations to ensure their systems are not exploited for illegal activities.

Fidelis Chukwu, a former National Vice-Chairperson of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in the South-East, has been appointed the new president-general of Ohanaeze Ndigbo. He succeeds Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu, who passed away on July 25, 2024.

Chukwu’s appointment was confirmed during an Imeobi Ohanaeze meeting on Saturday in Enugu, as announced by the group’s spokesperson, Chiedozie Ogbonnia. Chukwu will serve for 27 days, completing the remaining tenure of Imo State, which ends on January 10, 2024. His appointment follows the deaths of two previous Ohanaeze presidents-general—George Obiozor in 2022 and Iwuanyanwu in 2024—events which Ogbonnia described as a “chain of catastrophe.”

Ogbonnia explained that Iwuanyanwu was initially appointed in April 2023 through the application of a “doctrine of necessity” to complete the tenure of Obiozor, who was from Imo State. After Iwuanyanwu’s death, Imo State, through its Ohanaeze leadership, nominated Chukwu to finish the remaining term.

During the meeting, Cletus Ilomuanya, chairperson of the Imo Council of Elders, moved a motion for Chukwu’s adoption, which was seconded by Simon Okeke and passed via a voice vote.

The Imeobi Ohanaeze also resolved that the next president-general of the organization would be selected from Rivers State. This decision was confirmed in a communiqué signed by Ogbonnia and Ohanaeze Secretary-General Okey Emuchay. Additionally, the communiqué noted that the National Executive Committee would be responsible for the formation of the Election and Screening Committees for the upcoming Ohanaeze election.

Key figures present at the meeting included Enugu State Governor Peter Mbah (represented by Secretary to the State Government, Chidi Onyia), as well as leaders from Ohanaeze Ndigbo chapters across Abia, Anambra, Delta, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Rivers States. Other notable attendees included Senator Enyinnaya Abaribe, former APGA National Chair Chekwas Okorie, former Inspector-General of Police Mike Okiro, and former Minister of Power Chinedu Nebo.

Ohanaeze Ndigbo follows a rotational zoning arrangement for the president-general’s position, which alternates between the seven Igbo-speaking states of South-East and South-South Nigeria. The South-East consists of Enugu, Anambra, Ebonyi, Abia, and Imo States, while the South-South region is represented by Rivers and Delta States.

Under this zoning structure, each state produces the president-general to serve a single, four-year term. If a president-general’s tenure is cut short due to death or resignation, the affected state has the right to nominate a replacement to complete the remaining term, subject to ratification by the Imeobi Ohanaeze. Chukwu’s appointment makes him the 12th president-general of Ohanaeze Ndigbo.

Palestinian security forces clash with militants in West Bank

At least one person was killed as Palestinian security forces clashed with Palestinian militants and set up checkpoints on Saturday in the occupied West Bank city of Jenin, residents and medics said.

Gunshots and explosions could be heard in the city, where friction has risen in recent days between militant factions and the Western-backed Palestinian Authority (PA) of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas following raids by the PA.

Residents identified the man who was killed as a militant though none of the factions immediately confirmed his affiliation.

The PA's security branch said in a statement that its forces were undertaking a security operation to restore law and order to Jenin's historic refugee camp suburb, a stronghold of Palestinian militants alienated from the Palestinian leadership.

The Palestinian militant group Hamas, which has been fighting Israeli forces in Gaza for more than a year, condemned the PA for the Jenin operation and its allied group Islamic Jihad called for a day of protests.

Jenin has also been a hotbed of conflict between the Palestinian militant groups and the Israeli military in recent years. Since March 2022, Jenin and outlying areas in the north of the West Bank have drawn intensified Israeli raids after a spate of Palestinian street attacks.

Reuters